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SUPREMECOURTOFTHEUNITEDSTATES 
EARL ALLEN v. STEPHEN L. HARDY ET AL. 
ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED 
STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT 
No. 85-6593. Decided June-, 1986 
JUSTICE MARSHALL, dissenting. 
On all too many occasions in recent years, I have felt 
compelled to e>..-press my dissatisfaction with this Court's 
readiness to dispose summarily of petitions for certiorari on 
the merits without affording the parties prior notice or an 
opportunity to file briefs. See, e. g., City of Los Angeles v. 
Heller, 475 U. S. --, -- (1986) (MARSHALL, J., dissent-
ing); Cuyahoga Valley R. Co. v. Transportation Union, 474 
U. S. --, - - (1985) (MARSHALL, J ., dissenting); Maggio 
v. Fulford, 462 U. S. 111, 120-121 (1983) (MARSHALL, J., 
dissenting). "[B]y deciding cases summarily, without bene-
fit of oral argument and full briefing, and often with only 
limited access to, and review of, the record, this Court runs a 
great risk of rendering erroneous or ill-advised decisions that 
may confuse the lower courts: there is no reason to believe 
that this Court is immune from making mistakes, particularly 
under these kinds of circumstances." Hm-ris v. Rive·ta, 454 
U. 8. 339, 349 (1981) (MARSHALL, J., dissenting). 
The circumstances are even less propitious in this case. 
Generally when this Court summarily disposes of a petition 
for certiorari, we have at least benefited from the tendency of 
both petitioners and respondents to focus excessively on the 
merits of the question they ask the Court to consider. Here, 
because the petition was filed prior to our decision in Batson 
v. Kentucky, 476 U. S. -- (1986), petitioner never had the 
opportunity to address whether that decision should be ap-
plied retroactively to those seeking collateral review of their 
convictions, and respondent chose to devote but a single sen-
tence to the issue. In addition, that issue has not been ad-
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dt'<'mH.•d by low<•t· <'olut:-~ . 
Unlf('(t Sla/tJ!-1 v. 1/olltll . ~~~ LhtH c•:u;P cw atJy oUu.w. ~'.!P 
271 (1982) (R r A. ..'/ lOtH NlfJior ( nr ('r1 4f1u (j ~.:.-' ,1 , .. , 
. .. ( I(M IJN J I . , ') . I") &"411·1, 
HlalC' in this ("l"'<' •11 c '·, : · c l HH•·ntuJJ{). w,. wr·i!.f_; on a f'!1·a.n • •• ., ~ < J )HJ~;J()IJ WI' J' I k 
avoid. or, m::u·1 Y f~a 1; gn.:at p:11na t.c
1 
I believe that the C'c .• , . . 
ULieml h . "' )Ut " H c,pmton LcJday , ... JJN·Ls Uu· un-
'''=' Y aste Wtlh whid th · . J 
h h· b _ 1 ':! ltnporlanL qtlf'HLH>n prr.!f:H.:nlf'd r ere ~s Pc•n 0 j'(•solvNI. Lik<.· Lht• Court, nnlt~ at ·, J b•· 
Jeve t at the tmpad of a "nPw <'fJn.'il iLutional r·ulf·" em tho at ~uracy of a trial :>hould be• a <"ritical c•mcc..:rn in any mquiry 
l.nto wheU~cr that rule Hhould b('.! applit.:d n.!Lr·oac·tivc,; ly trJ 
cases pcndmg on collateral revic.! w; indef'fJ, r think that f:-v·lcJr 
should generally be df'cis iVf'. Se(! wl:llutrrui v. r hulr~rl ~tales, 401 U. S. ()4f.i, fjfjf) (l!J7 1) (MARSHALL, .J., concurring 
m part and dissenting in part). How8ver, r arn not at all 
persuaded by the majority's Cfmclusicm that the rule an-
nounced in Bat.•wn Jacks 11Such a fundamental impaet rm the 
integrity of factfinding as to c()mpel retroactive applicati(m,'' 
ante, at 4. The Court is surely correct to nrJte that the ruiP 
"serves other values" besides accurate factfinding. Ibid .. 
"The effect of excluding minorities gcJf.m bey(Jnd the individual 
defendant, for such exclusion produces 1injury to the jury 
system, to the Jaw as an institution, to the community at 
large, and to the democratiC' ideal n~flf~Cted in the prc>cesscs 
of our courts."' McCray v. New York, 4f>1 U. S. !Jfil., !J68 
(1983) (MARSHALL, .} . , dissenting from deni~1l of certiorari). 
A rule that targets sueh discriminatory practices will thus 
provide redress to citiums unconstituti()Clally struck from 
jury panels. That criminal defendants will not be the only 
beneficiaries of the rule, hrJwever, should hardly diminish our 
assessment of the rule's impact upon the ability of defendants 
to receive a fair and accurate trial. Moreover, I do not share 
the majority's confidence that "other procedures" in place 
prior to our decision in Batson "creat[e] a high probability 
that the individual jurrJrs seated in a particular case were 
free from bia.~,'' anl11, at 4. When the prosecution uncon· 
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stitutionally uses its 
and Hispanics from t:e~emptory sti·ikes to remove blacks 
process is not cured b e Jury' the thr_eat to the truth finding 
that white . Y. measures clestgned merely to ensure 
d '" . JUr~r~ permitted to serve satisfy the legal stancl-ar 10r tmpartiahty. 
"Wh 
. ~n any large and identifiable segment of the commu-
ruty IS ex~luded form jury service, the effect is to remove 
?-om the JUry room qualities of human nature and variet-
Ies of human experience, the range of which is unknown 
and perhaps unknowable. It is not necessary to assume 
that the excluded group will consistently vote as a class 
in order to conclude ... that its exclusion deprives the 
jury of a perspective on human events that may have un-
suspected importance in any case that may be pre-
sented." Peters v. Kiff, 407 U. S. 49:3, 508-504 (1972) 
(opinion of MARSHALL, ,J .). 
Certainly, one need not assume that the exclusion of any dis-
tinctive group from the venire will affect the integrity of the 
factfinding process to believe, as I do, that where the pros-
ecution uses its peremptory challenges to cull black and His-
panic jurors from the jury empaneled for the trial of a black 
defendant, the threat to the accuracy of the trial is significant 
and unacceptable. See Batson, supra, at--, n. 8 ("For a 
jury to perform its intended function as a check on official 
power, it must be a body drawn from the community"). 
The other considerations that the Court fincls to counsel 
against retroactivity here are similarly unpcrsuasive. While 
Bat:~fm overruled Swain v. Alabam.n, :380 U. S. 202 (1965) by 
changing the burden of proof imposecl upon both defendants 
and prosecutors, ante, at 5, the Court seriously overesti-
mates the "reliance interest of law enforcement officials" in 
the old regime. This is not a case in which primary conduct 
by such officials was permitted by one decision of this Court 
and then prohibited by another. Swain made quite clear 
that the use of peremptory challenges to strike black jurors 
on account of their race violated the Equal Protection Clause. 
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All Batson did was o-ive d f< d 
Prohib.t· E ~~ e en ants a means of enforcing this 1 IOn. ven if the C urt · will' . 
tors to hav · 0 15 mg to consider prosecu-
e relied on the effective unenforceability of the pronouncements 1'n s · · h . 
wa1.n, It s ould at least give some tho.u~ht as to whether that t·eliance should be deemed legitimate. 
Finally, the Court observes that "retl·oactive application of 
the Batson rule on collateral review of final convictions would 
seriously disrupt the administration of justice." Ante, at 5. 
Perhaps this is true; perhaps it is not. Certainly, the papers 
before us in this case allow us no basis for making any esti-
mate of how many defendants pursuing federal habeas relief 
have preserved a Batson claim in the State courts. In this 
inquiry, perhaps more than in any other aspect of the case, 
the need for further briefing, and perhaps the participation of 
interested amici, is compelling, and the majority's readiness 
to act on its own uninformed assumptions, disturbing. 
I would grant the petition for certiorari and set the case for 
briefing on the merits and oral argument next Term. 
